Abstract
INTRODUCTION
Although deprivation of liberty entails legitimate restrictions of certain rights -most obviously to freedom of movement, privacy and the freedom to work -detainees must be held in a manner that respects their dignity. 1 Persons deprived of their liberty are protected under national constitutional law and by human rights treaties, which prohibit cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment or treatment, particularly in the three human rights systems functioning under the auspices of the Council of Europe, the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the African Union (AU). Despite these guarantees, appalling prison conditions are still present in many States. Starting from the premise that detainees are a group most open to the vagaries of public opinion, and at best to the neglect and at worst to the abuse by national legal systems, 2 this contribution investigates the potential and actual complementary role of interim ('provisional' 3 or 'precautionary' 4 ) measures 5 (PMs) adopted within regional human rights systems in protecting persons deprived of their liberty. Th e focus here falls on PMs, rather than on fi ndings on the merits, because the immediacy of these measures makes them particularly relevant to detainees. An ex post facto determination that a detainee's rights had been violated may be important to establish State responsibility, but may easily render the aff ected person's rights illusory. PMs are of primary importance in time-sensitive situations, where an urgent response is called for. As appears from the discussion below, PMs have, in regional human rights systems, indeed most oft en been invoked in the context of detention.
In doing so, a critical overview and analysis of the PMs issued by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission), the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Court), the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Inter-American Commission or IACmHR) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court or IACHR) is undertaken. Th e European 1 Th e term deprivation of liberty will be used in cases related to arrest, detention or imprisonment. According to the 1998 Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (GA Res 43/173, 9 December 1988), 'arrest' is defi ned as 'the act of apprehending a person for the alleged commission of an off ence or by the action of an authority', whereas 'detention' and 'imprisonment' relate to 'the condition' of a person deprived of personal liberty, depending whether or not following a conviction for an off ence. . Th e substance of the African Charter was extended by the adoption of this Protocol over which the African Commission and Court also have jurisdiction, including the competence to issue PMs.
11
Th e American Convention (also called 'Pact of San José of Costa Rica') was adopted in San José, Costa Rica, by the OAS on 22 November 1969 and entered into force on 18 July 1978. See art 5. InterAmerican human rights treaties and documents can be viewed on the website of the OAS available at <www.oas.org> accessed 1 January 2014. 12 Th e American Declaration was adopted in Bogota, Colombia, by the OAS in April 1948. Th e Declaration includes in art XXV that every person who has been deprived of his liberty has the right to humane treatment during the time he is in custody. 13 Th e Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture was adopted in Cartagena, Colombia, by the OAS on 9 December 1985 and entered into force on 28 February 1987. Th e Convention contains a defi nition of torture but does not distinguish it from other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. See art 1 and 2. At the universal level, cruel, inhuman or person -including detainees -the right to humane treatment. 14 Th e African Charter provides in Article 5 that every individual has the right to respect of the dignity inherent in a human being, and prohibits torture, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment. Article 5(2) of the American Convention prohibits torture and cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment, 15 and requires that persons deprived of their liberty be treated with respect for their inherent dignity. Th e American Convention and the Maputo Protocol also indicate that, when States exercise their duty to protect the well-being of prisoners, they must take into consideration any special vulnerability of a detained person arising, for instance, from being minors 16 or women. 17 Consistent to what is mentioned above, in conditions of detention, States are the main guarantor of the rights of the persons deprived of their liberty, and therefore States are responsible for what occurs inside detention centres. Detainees should be ensured a minimum standard of living, and they should be treated with dignity. Nonetheless, the jurisprudence of the African Commission, the African Court, the IACmHR and IACHR show that several prisoners and detainees in many detention facilities in Africa and the Americas confront conditions that are inhuman. Prisoners are detained in severely overcrowded penitentiaries; ill prisoners do not have access to medical care; and convicted prisoners are sentenced to death without due process. Furthermore, in some cases specifi c reference has been made to police brutality and the use of torture for the purpose of extracting confessions.
Th e contribution is divided in fi ve parts. Th e fi rst section deals with the normative basis which gives competence to the African Commission and Court, and the InterAmerican Commission and Court to request PMs. Th e next section, considers degrading treatment or punishment is not defi ned either in the United Nations Convention against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (also called 'Torture Convention') which treats it as a residual category for acts that do not rise to the level of torture. See UNGA Res 39/46 art 16(1). Th e Human Rights Committee has said that '[i]t may be not necessary to draw sharp distinctions between the various prohibited forms of treatment or punishment. Th ese distinctions depend on the kind, purpose and severity of the particular treatment'. Human Rights Committee, General Comment N. 7: Torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (art 7) para 2. Th e Torture Convention was adopted in New York, USA, on 10 December 1984 and entered into force on 26 June 1987. 14 See African Charter, art 4. American Convention, art 4 and 5, and American Declaration, art 1. 15 Th e IACHR has defi ned the scope of this right as one that has several gradations, and embraces treatment ranging from torture to other types of humiliation or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment with varying degrees of physical and psychological eff ects caused by endogenous and exogenous factors, which must be proven in each specifi c situation. See Th e Maputo Protocol indicates in art 2 that 'States Parties shall take appropriate and eff ective measures to ensure that, in those countries where the death penalty still exists, not to carry out death sentences on pregnant or nursing women'. the frequency of the use of PMs in the African and the Inter-American systems in general, and in respect of situations of detention, specifi cally. Th is is followed by an analysis of the diverse situations of danger in which detainees have requested PMs. Th e next section evaluates the follow-up mechanism to monitor compliance and the (un)willingness of the Member States to abide by PMs. Th e conclusion briefl y emphasizes some positive and negative aspects of the interim measures and makes some recommendations.
LEGAL BASIS
In international human rights law PMs have been developed as a tool for preventing human rights violations. At the regional level, in Africa and the Americas, both the Commissions and Courts are competent in cases of extreme gravity and urgency to issue PMs, in order to prevent irreparable damage to the rights of victim(s) and person(s) protected under the human rights treaties ratifi ed by the Member States. None of the universal or regional human rights treaties establishing quasi-judicial bodies bestows an explicit mandate on quasi-judicial monitoring bodies to issue PMs. 18 However, the Rules of Procedure of these bodies have for decades served as the basis for institutionalizing practices of issuing interim measures. In 1988, the African Commission incorporated the competence to adopt such measures in its fi rst set of Rules of Procedure, more specifi cally in Rule 109. When it amended its Rules of Procedure in 1995, the Commission elaborated upon its competence to adopt PMs in Rule 111. 19 Since 2010, the restated competence to adopt PMs has been contained in Rule 98 of the Commissions' current Rules of Procedure, which states that 'the Commission may, on its initiative or at the request of a party to the Communication, request that the State concerned adopt Provisional Measures to prevent irreparable harm to the victim or victims of the alleged violation as urgently as the situation demands'. 20 In the Inter-American system, PMs were also expressly incorporated in the fi rst Commission's Rules of Procedure in 1980. Since 2009, the restated competence to 18 See for example Human Rights Committee, Rules of Procedure, r 92; the Committee Against Torture, Rules of Procedure r 114(1); African Commission, Rules of Procedure, r 98; the extinct European Commission of HR, Rules of Procedure, r 36; the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Rules of Procedure, r 94(3) and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against women, Rules of Procedure, r 63(1).
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Th e Rules of Procedure were adopted by the African Commission during its 2nd ordinary session held in Dakar (Senegal), from 2 to 13 February 1988 and were revised during its 18th ordinary session held in Praia (Cabo-Verde), from 2 to 11 October 1995. Th e Rules were also revised during its 47th ordinary session held in Banjul (Th e Gambia), from 12 to 26 May 2010 and entered into force on 18 August 2010.
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African Commission, 2010 Rules of Procedure, r 98 (1).
Intersentia adopt PMs has been contained in Rule 25 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure, which states that the Commission may, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, request that a State adopt precautionary measures. Such measures, whether related to a petition or not, shall concern serious and urgent situations presenting a risk of irreparable harm to persons or to the subject matter of a pending petition or case before the organs of the inter-American system. 21 It is mentioned that the adoption of PMs by the IACmHR requires the existence of a 'serious' and 'urgent situation' that may cause 'irreparable harm' to persons if action is not taken. 22 Th e adoption of PMs by the African Commission is formulated slightly diff erently, in that it may adopt PMs in order 'to prevent irreparable harm' to the victim or the victims of the alleged violation as 'urgently' as the situation demands. 23 Although the preconditions for the adoption of interim measures by the two quasijudicial organs are not exactly similar − there is no specifi c mention that the African Commission may act in 'serious' situations − in practical terms, the provisions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In both human rights systems, urgent situations are clearly present when there is an imminent risk to the right to life, the right to personal integrity, the right to health or the right to fair trial of persons deprived of liberty, involving, for example, unlawful death sentences, the risk of torture or serious danger arising from harsh conditions of detention. In addition, the IACmHR may also adopt PMs independently of any pending petition or case. 24 In other words, the Commission has the competence to take PMs on its own initiative or at the request of anybody when it has reliable information about a situation, in order to prevent irreparable harm to a person. Th is position contrasts clearly with that pertaining to the African Commission, which may only issue PMs in as far as they relate to a matter pending before it.
Th e lack of a treaty basis of the competence to adopt PMs has given rise to a debate about the legally binding nature of these measures. Th e legality of PMs to uphold the rights of the petitioner pending fi nalisation of a submitted case lies partly in the individual complaints procedure itself. Since States have accepted this procedure, they also have to ensure that it operates eff ectively in practice. Disregarding a PM is therefore mala fi de and undermines the treaty purpose of providing the possibility of restitutio in integrum to victims, as the IACHR held in and Government (the Assembly). Unlike the IACmHR, the African Commission has an obligation under Article 59 of the African Charter to keep its protective activities, including requests for PMs, confi dential. Consequently, the public only has access to the decisions of cases that are published in the Activity Reports of the African Commission, following the Assembly's decision to authorise their publication. In addition, because the Commission does not consistently include its decisions on PMs in its Activity Reports, separately, but only make reference to these measures as part of its decisions on the merits when a communication has been decided fi nally, a full picture of these is not provided in the offi cial record of activities. Th e African Court only has jurisdiction over the 27 States that have ratifi ed the Court Protocol. By 2013, the African Court adopted orders for PMs in three cases. Th e fi rst was in respect of the bombing of the civilian population of Libya, in early 2011; 39 the second was in respect of the rights of an indigenous community in Kenya's Moi Forest; 40 and the third was in respect of the deceased Libyan President Gaddafi 's son. 41 In the Inter-American system, the IACmHR may request PMs with respect to all 35 Member States of the OAS, and their adoption does not require a case to be pending before the Commission, nor do the measures need to be prompted by a complaint/ communication of human rights violations. 42 Th ese practices have permitted the Commission to grant PMs in a signifi cant number of cases and in a great variety of circumstances. Th e annual reports of the IACmHR show that between 1994 43 and 2012, 771 PMs were granted. 44 Th is means that almost 43 measures were adopted every year. 45 If the activity rate of the African Commission, which in 24 years has adopted only some 22 PMs, is compared with the rate of the IACmHR, it is possible to conclude without fear of contradiction that the IACmHR has been much more active. However, the lack of data on the PMs that were rejected or not answered by the IACmHR is problematic. With regard to this subject, 3009 requests of PMs were 46 During the same period, 474 measures were adopted, which means that only about 15 per cent of the requests were granted. Th e other requests were rejected or remained unanswered: there is little solid information on the subject. Th is lack of information is unfortunate. It appears that the widely held belief that the IACmHR almost always grants PMs is unfounded.
Th e Court does not have the competence to adopt PMs with regard to all Members States of the OAS. Only States that have ratifi ed the American Convention and accepted the jurisdiction of the Court must comply with PMs. As of 2014, only 23 of the 35 States have ratifi ed the Convention and of them, only 20 have accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the Court. Th e IACHR has over the years issued many PMs. From 1987 to 2011, the Court adopted 374 PMs, of which 80 were initial order(s) adopted in a case, while 9 requests for PMs were rejected. Th e others were maintained, broadened, lift ed or reinstated. 47 In 2012, the Court received 7 new requests, four of them concerned penitentiary centres in Venezuela. 48 In both human rights systems, prisoners have been the group of benefi ciaries with the highest number of PMs requested. Interim measures granted to protect detainees represent 39 per cent (9 out of 23) 49 of the total of measures adopted by the African Commission, 50 and 27 per cent (210 out of 771) of the total of measures adopted by the IACmHR. 51 One of the three orders for PMs so far adopted by the African Court deals with a situation of detention. Th e Inter-American Court has over the years ordered numerous PMs to protect detainees, especially in Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela. 52 Th e Commission received 28 requests of PMs and it only adopted 23. Some of the PMs were adopted by the Commission on its own motion. In some cases two diff erent decisions of PMs were adopted, See (n 37).
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In the African system, PMs have also protected: a political candidate (1 out of 28); non-nationals (2 out of 28); collective groups of people (6 out of 28); equipment of broadcasters (2 out of 28). 
INTERIM MEASURES PROTECTING PERSONS DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY
Given the oft en terrible conditions of detention in Africa and the Americas, prisoners have received protection as individuals (Africa and the Americas) and as collectives (the Americas) through PMs. Interim measures have protected clearly identifi ed persons and also groups of very signifi cant sizes, for example, all inmates in certain prisons. Th e following section provides a detailed analysis of the situations in which PMs were requested.
AFRICAN SYSTEM UNDER THE AFRICAN COMMISSION
Detainees in Africa have been protected in a number of instances, 53 including those alleging unlawful arrest, 54 being sentenced to death 55 and being kept in appalling health conditions. 56 Some prisoners have been in custody suff ering from oppressive regimes. Especially in recent years, there is a clear concern with regard to suspected terrorists. Th e response of the African Commission to request PMs may be divided into two categories in respect of which the Commission (i) granted (explicit) provisional measures, 57 and (ii) launched an 'urgent appeal' to the State concerned or voiced and transmitted its 'concerns' about the situation (here referred to as adopting Intersentia 'implicit provisional measures'). 58 From 1988 until 2013, the African Commission received seven requests for PMs in respect of detained persons. Of these requests, the Commission explicitly granted six 59 while it rejected one. 60 Furthermore, on one occasion, the Commission adopted PMs on its own initiative; 61 and in two cases PMs were adopted, but there is no information to indicate whether the Commission acted on its own motion or following a request. 62 Cases were related to political prisoners and human rights defenders: one case involved Togo, 63 two cases involved Nigeria, 64 one case related to presumed terrorists condemned to death in Egypt 65 and one case related to a person arbitrary detained in Libya. 66 Additionally, the Commission granted implicit provisional measures in four cases: two cases related to persons unlawfully arrested, including one case involving three journalists in Liberia and one case involving eleven former government offi cials in Eritrea; and two cases related to persons sentenced to death penalty, including one case in Nigeria and one case in Burundi.
Prisoners sentenced to death, tortured and ill-treated
Th e African Commission granted PMs in order to protect persons sentenced to death in four cases. In such cases, the Commission usually requests the State to suspend the implementation of the death penalty, pending the outcome of the consideration of the complaints before the Commission.
In an infamous case related to Nigeria, the Commission ordered the protection of Saro-Wiwa, the president of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and other members of MOSOP. 67 In this case, the Commission adopted 58 Th ese implicit PMs call special attention due to the fact that, although the Commission does not explicitly mention the term 'provisional measures' or the rule that contemplates this legal tool, the formulation is very similar. Th e Commission requests the States to act in a certain manner, while clarifying that the order given does not prejudge the merits of the communication. Tsatsu Tsikata case (n 53).
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Nigerian Newspapers Proscription case (n 54). Togo Detention case (n 57).
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Saro-Wiwa case (n 37) and Nigerian Newspapers Proscription case (n 54). PMs on two occasions. Th e fi rst PM was issued in November 1994, requesting the Nigerian government not to cause irreparable prejudice towards Saro-Wiwa. 68 According to the communication, Mr Saro-Wiwa had been detained because of his political work. He had been severely beaten during his detention and held in very poor conditions. Th e second request was granted one year later. Taking into account that the benefi ciaries were sentenced to death while the case was pending before the African Commission, the Commission asked Nigeria that the death sentences be delayed until the Commission had fi nalised its mission and spoken with the competent authorities. 69 Th e Commission also protected presumed terrorists sentenced to death by hanging, aft er being accused of bombings in Egypt in 2004 and 2005. 70 According to the complainants, agents of the Egyptian Intelligence Service had subjected the victims to various forms of torture and ill-treatment during their detention, in order to obtain their confessions. 71 Th e Commission's PMs requested the Egyptian government to suspend the executions while the communication was before the Commission. 72 Implicit provisional measures were granted in the Bwampamye case in which the victim had been sentenced to death without the assistance of his lawyer. Th e benefi ciary had been condemned for having incited the population to commit crimes, and for having under the same circumstances organised an attack geared towards provoking massacres and setting up barricades with a view to hindering the enforcement of public order. 73 In this case, the Chairperson of the Commission decided on his own motion to appeal to the Burundian Head of State, requesting a stay of the execution pending the determination of the communication. 74 Provisional measures were also granted in order to protect a Nigerian woman sentenced to death by stoning, by a sharia court, for the alleged crime of adultery. Th e complainants alleged that the right of legal representation in the sharia courts was very limited, and even when legal representation was allowed, only lawyers who were Muslims could practice in these courts. 75 
Prisoners unlawfully arrested and ill-treated
Cases related to prisoners who have been ill-treated, kept in appalling conditions and unlawfully arrested have also been submitted before the African Commission. In these cases, States are requested to intervene in the matter, pending the outcome of the consideration of the complaint before the Commission. Th e African Commission requests the State concerned, in general terms, to guarantee the rights of the benefi ciary and to avoid irreparable damage.
In a case related to a Togolese prisoner, the complainants alleged that Corporal Bikagni had been subjected to torture and maltreatment. Under duress, he confessed that he had planned a coup against the government. 77 Th e Commission requested the Togolese government '(to) ensur(e) […] the security of the victim and to avoid irreparable damage prejudice to be infl icted on the victim of the alleged violations'. 78 In another case, it was alleged that eleven former Eritrean government offi cials had illegally been arrested due their political opinions in 2001. Th e complainants requested PMs following the subsequent announcement by the government that they had been detained 'because of crimes against the nation's security and sovereignty', and the government's refusal to allow them access to their families and lawyers. 79 the African Commission wrote letters appealing to the President of Eritrea, in May 2002, 'urging him to intervene in the matter being complained of, pending the outcome of the consideration of the complaint before the Commission'. 80 In October 2002, the Commission reminded the State that 'it was the responsibility of the member state's general public prosecutor to bring any accused persons before a competent court of law in accordance with the rules guaranteeing fair trial under relevant national and international instruments'; 81 and in June 2003, it appealed to the Eritrean President 'to intervene in this matter and urge the authorities holding the individuals to release them or bring them before the courts in Eritrea'. 82 In the Woods case, implicit PMs were issued to protect three journalists of the independent 'Analyst' newspaper in Monrovia (Liberia). Th e journalists had allegedly been arbitrary arrested and detained without charge. 83 Four months aft er the persons 76 ibid para 10.
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Communication on unlawful detention. Togo Detention case (n 57) para 1. Woods and Another case (n 53) paras 2, 9.
had been jailed and aft er a request for PMs was submitted, the African Commission appealed to the President of Liberia, '[…] respectfully urging him to intervene in the matter being complained of, pending the outcome of the consideration of the case before the Commission'. 84 Th e complainants had requested the Commission to order the authorities to immediately release the journalists. 85 In this matter, it was not appropriate to order the authorities to release the journalists, because this would lead to prejudging the case on the merits, and this goes against the purpose of PMs. However, the Commission could also adopt specifi c PMs by, for example, asking the State for information about the legal situation of the benefi ciaries as to the allegations. 86 In a recent case, the African Commission v Lybia, 87 
AFRICAN SYSTEM UNDER THE AFRICAN COURT
Th e Court may order PMs in respect of cases pending before it, or it may be approached with a specifi c request to order such measures. Non-compliance with the Commission's interim measures may result in a referral of that matter to the African Court. 89 Th is is exactly what transpired in respect of the Gaddafi 's son case. Some ten months aft er the Commission had issued its request for PMs in this matter, it referred the case to the Court for its determination on the merits. 90 Although the Commission did not explicitly request the Court to adopt PMs, one of the reasons for the referral was the non-compliance by the State with the PMs. 91 Th e Court ordered that the State refrain from any 'judicial proceedings, investigations or detention' that could cause irreparable harm to Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi , or harm his physical and mental integrity or his health. 92 Of the three mentioned cases before the Court, this is the only one of relevance to the rights of detainees. African Commission v Libya (n 41).
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Th e matter was referred under Rule 118(2); although Rule 18(3) (referring to 'serious or massive violations') is also invoked, this basis is much less clear and persuasive, given that a single person's limited right to fair trial process is at stake. 
Prisoners Sentenced to Death
Th e Inter-American Commission has protected detainees sentenced to death on several occasions, despite the fact that the American Convention authorizes the death penalty in exceptional circumstances. 94 In these cases, the complainants alleged violations of the American Declaration or the American Convention. 95 Prisoners sentenced to death represent 18 per cent of the total of the benefi ciaries (139 out of 771). Th ey were always persons clearly identifi ed. Almost half of the prisoners were in jail in US (65 out of 139), and the other half in Trinidad and Tobago (41 out of 139) and Jamaica (20 out of 139). Th is means that most of these PMs apply to Member States of the OAS, which are exclusively under the supervision of the Commission. 100 Th e United States has not ratifi ed the American Convention, Jamaica has ratifi ed the American Convention but has not accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the IACHR, and Trinidad and Tobago denounced the American Convention in 1998. With the exception of a few foreigners, 101 most of the benefi ciaries have been nationals, some of whom were in a special condition of vulnerability as they suff ered mental problems, 102 or they were under eighteen years of age when they committed the crime. 103
Detainees being kept in Deplorable Health Conditions
Detainees in precarious health conditions received protection on 25 occasions. Th e situations are particularly problematic because the medical care that ill prisoners need can only be provided by the State. Th e health of the prisoner depends totally on the will of the State authorities. 104 Petitioners usually claim that the prisoners are seriously ill, and that there is a high probability of serious repercussions on their right to life and personal integrity. Furthermore, the illness frequently needs special treatment, a long term care that is not always easy to realise within prison, and its costs are very high. Some inmates have cancer, 105 As a result of the traditional diffi culty to request protection of economic and social rights, complainants oft en request their protection by linking these rights to civil rights, such as the right to life (Article 4) and the right to humane treatment (Article 5). 124 In this regard, the IACmHR protected the right to health, independently of the right to life and the right to humane treatment, in two cases only. 
Detainees being kept in Appalling Conditions
Taking into account that in the Americas several detention centres have structural problems that aff ect the entire population of persons deprived of liberty, the Commission has requested States to implement PMs in a collective dimension. As such, in those cases prisoners are seen as a group or collective that is potentially at risk.
Sometimes a situation of extreme gravity and urgency is created when the detainees are not separated in categories; for example, convicted and pre-trial inmates, 126 members of armed groups and common prisoners, 127 members of diff erent armed groups (guerrilla and paramilitary) 128 or minors and adults. 129 In other cases, the situation of danger is due to a lack of control of the prisoners by the prison offi cials, involving deplorable conditions of detention and high levels of violence. 130 For example, in the Inmates in the Urso Branco prison matter, it was alleged that there were several confl icts between groups of inmates, as well as a massacre among the prisoners resulting in the deaths of over 30 inmates. 131 Other matters are concerned with detainees who suff er from overcrowded conditions. 132 In one case, it was mentioned that there were 1000 detainees, including young off enders, in cells with a capacity of 205 persons. 133 Usually, under such circumstances, infectious diseases spread easily, the level of violence among inmates increases, and adequate medical care is not provided.
Th e IACmHR pays special attention to requests related to imprisoned children because of their specifi c dependency and because children are particularly vulnerable to violence under penitentiary circumstances. 134 has granted PMs, of both a collective and individual character. During the period under examination, the Commission protected in total 225 children detained in a re-education centre in Paraguay, 135 62 minors detained in Guatemala 136 and minors detained in fi ve institutions in Brazil. 137 Th e approximately 254 detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, are also included in this category. Th ese detainees were transported by the US following their capture in Afghanistan on 12 January 2002. Th e US refused to consider these detainees as prisoners of war until a competent tribunal determined otherwise, which means that the detainees were held arbitrarily and incommunicado for a prolonged period of time and they had been interrogated without legal counsel. 138 Th e Commission requested the US, two months aft er they began transferring to its naval base persons captured in connection with US-led military operation against terrorism, 139 to take 'urgent measures necessary to determine the legal status of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay' . 140 Th e request concerned 254 male prisoners of 25 diff erent nationalities. Since that time, PMs have been maintained, reiterated 141 and broadened. 142 In 2013, the Commission required the US to close the detention facility.
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM UNDER THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT

Prisoners Sentenced to Death
As of 2013, the Court has only requested in three cases that all necessary measures be taken to preserve the life and physical integrity of certain persons on death row. One Detainees being held by the United States at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (USA) matter (n 138). case related to Barbados, 143 one to Guatemala, 144 and one to Trinidad and Tobago. 145 In the latter case, the Court ordered PMs in respect of more than 30 persons sentenced to death and awaiting execution. Th e Court eventually found that the right of these detainees to life, to a fair trial and judicial protection, and to humane treatment had been violated. 146 Pending the fi nalisation of the case on its merits, 147 the Court, at the request of the Commission, broadened on seven occasions the PMs. 148 It is a testimony to the persistence of the Court, and the credibility of the PMs procedure that the State only executed two of the benefi ciaries of these measures, despite the fact that Trinidad and Tobago denounced the Convention with eff ect from May 1999. 149 It is important to mention the Boyce and Joseph v Barbados case in which PMs were adopted to protect four persons sentenced to death. In this case, the orders had already been read out and the executions were scheduled four days aft er the request. In view of the urgency of the matter, PMs were adopted the same day that they were requested. 150 
Detainees being kept in Appalling Conditions
A signifi cant number of persons deprived of their liberty benefi ted from the Court's provisional measures, including those in prisons, 151 and also in mental hospitals and institutional child care. 152 States have been requested to conform prison conditions 143 to the minimum international standards 153 and to give adequate medical attention to inmates when their health is in danger. 154 In Loayza Tamayo v Peru, the Court requested PMs to protect a woman who was serving a sentence of 20 years. It was stated that Ms. Loayza spent 23.5 hours a day in an extremely small, damp and cold cell. She was not allowed to have a radio or magazines, nor could she receive visitors. 155 In Cesti Hurtado v Peru, it was concluded that the health of a detainee was in grave danger since he was not allowed to receive medicine for a heart problem that he had had for numerous years. 156 In these cases, the Court adopted PMs to avoid irreparable damage to the physical, psychological and moral integrity of the detainees.
In the matter probably involving the most comprehensive PMs and number of benefi ciaries, the Matters of Certain Venezuelan Penitentiary Centres, 157 the IACHR from 2006 started engaging with the conditions of detention in a number of prisons in Venezuela. In its orders, the Court requires the State to take immediate measures to ensure that no further detainee is killed or treated inhumanely. However, the Court goes much further by requiring measures of a more general and far-reaching nature, such as the separation of 'accused' from 'convicted inmates', the provision of health care to all inmates, the reduction of overcrowding, the provision of adequately trained staff , and most comprehensive in scope, ensuring that prison conditions conform with 'applicable international standards'. By the beginning of 2014, this matter was still being supervised by the Court, as violent acts culminating in the deaths of many inmates still persist.
A practice has evolved that the IACmHR refers matters in which it has issued PMs to the IACHR, if the States do not comply with the measures ordered. Th e case law shows that from 1987 to 2011, 65 out of 80 PMs were adopted by the Court at the request of the Commission, and 43 of these cases (54 per cent) had previously received PMs. 158 Burbano-Herrera (n 47) 156-57.
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Loayza Tamayo v Peru (n 151) "Having seen" 3. In the same case See Order of 2 July 1996, "Having seen" 4, 7.
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Cesti Hurtado v Peru (n 151) "Considering" 7.
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On 6 September 2012 the Court decided to join the processing of some matters and to establish that, thereaft er, the joint PMs would be known as the "Matters of certain Venezuelan prisons". When the matter is under consideration of the Commission, only the Commission is competent to request the Court PMs. If, however, the case has been submitted to the Court, the Commission, the the 'Complexo de Tatuape' of FEBEM (Brazil). In this case, the Commission in 2004, issued PMs addressed to uphold the rights of the children and adolescents detainees. Because the situation did not improve, and the children were subjected to increasing dangers, the Commission directed a request for PMs to the Court. 159 
COMPLIANCE
Although compliance with international, including regional human rights standards, generally, has received increasing attention from treaty bodies, international organisations, and academics, this aspect is in many respects the Achilles' heel of international human rights protection. 160 Compliance by States is compromised by many factors including a lack of political will, geopolitical factors, ignorance and weak civil society engagement with international human rights in many countries. Below, the problems experienced concerning PM compliance, specifi cally, are scrutinised. According to the scarce information available at present, States have complied with these orders in at least some instances. In some cases, death penalty orders were suspended pending the fi nal decision of the African Commission. Th is was the case Saro-Wiwa case (n 37) para 32. In the Radio Freedom FM case aft er the complainants made oral submissions on the failure of the State to comply the State delegates indicated that they had not been made aware of the request and the head of delegation off ered his good offi ces with a view to facilitating an amicable solution of the matter. See Radio Freedom FM case (n 57) para 14. 163 Rule 98(4).
AFRICAN SYSTEM
Intersentia
in Burundi, 164 Egypt, 165 and Nigeria. 166 In a case related to a detainee from Togo who was subjected to torture and ill-treatment, there was also information of State compliance. 167 Th e case of Ms Hussaini deserves special mention. Since it is the only case in the African system where the individualised benefi ciary of a PM is a woman. 168 Th e victim was a Nigerian nursing mother sentenced to death by stoning by a sharia court, for the alleged crime of adultery. 169 Th ree months aft er the request of the 'urgent appeal' was notifi ed to Nigeria, the Federal Court of Appeal in Nigeria overturned the death sentence imposed on Safi ya by the lower sharia court. 170 Th ere was also information of compliance in the Miss A case. Th e Commission had asked Cameroon to ensure that appropriate medical care was provided to two detainees. 171 Th e case was positively resolved when Cameroon sent a letter to the Commission, in which it held that the fi rst person, Mr Ningo, had been acquitted and freed in November 2003 'for lack of criminal charges', while the second person, Mr Philip, had been freed in March 2003 'for non-proven facts'. 172 As already mentioned, it is not always possible to establish whether PMs were implemented because: (i) aft er the adoption of the measures, the Commission makes no further mention of them; (ii) it is oft en not possible to deduce from the decision on the merits of the communication if the measures were implemented; and (iii) oft en, when the case is still under consideration before the Commission, and due to the principle of confi dentiality, 173 there is no information about their implementation either from the Commission or from the complainants. However, the analysis of the little information obtained shows that the compliance rate of PMs under the African system is and remains a problem. For example, in cases related to the death penalty, the government of Nigeria executed nine persons condemned to death, despite the PMs issued by the African Commission to suspend their execution. 174 In Eritrea, although the Commission on several occasions had drawn the attention of the Eritrean President to the dimension of the violation of human rights and the deplorable attitude of the authorities towards 11 former Eritrean government offi cials who had been illegally arrested without charge and held incommunicado, 175 the PMs adopted did not result in any action being taken on the part of the Eritrean
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authorities. 176 When the Commission decided on the merits of the communication in November 2003, the benefi ciaries' whereabouts were still unknown. And, in the Botswana Death Penalty case in which a South African woman was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, the authorities argued that they had never received the request of PMs. 177 Th e lack of implementation by Libya of the Court's order in the case of Gaddafi 's son, prompted the Court to draw the attention of the AU Assembly to Libya's failure to report back to the Court on measures taken. 178 It called on the Assembly to 'express itself' on the matter; to call on Libya to comply immediately and to inform the Court within 14 days of the measures it has taken to comply with the Court's order; and to take all other appropriate measures to ensure that Libya fully complies. Th ere is however no indication that the Assembly has taken any action in response to this call.
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
As to the matter of compliance, States in the Americas sometimes protect a few benefi ciaries but not all of them, States comply with certain issues but not with others, or States comply with the requests within certain periods of time but in others they do not. For example, the US has suspended executions of the death penalty of some benefi ciaries, 179 but it has also executed benefi ciaries sentenced to death. 180 Th e IACmHR has published information on PMs issued to suspend death penalty orders in 43 instances. Th is fi gure corresponds to one third of the measures adopted. According to this information, fourteen orders of execution were suspended, 181 176 Ibid "Findings". Th e Commission found violations of the right not to discriminate (art 2), the right to liberty and security (art 6), the right to a fair trial (art 7(1)) and the right to information and freedom of expression (art 9(2)) of the African Charter. Intersentia in three cases the sentence was commuted, 182 on two occasions the inmates were released. 183 Th is means that less than half of the measures were complied with. 184 All orders to suspend the death penalty were connected with the United States.
Because of the lack of reporting provided by the Commission, it is not possible to have a complete evaluation of compliance, as it is oft en not clear what actually happened with the benefi ciaries. 185 However, the information found indicates that benefi ciaries sentenced to death were executed in 26 cases. 186 With the exception of one case, the benefi ciaries were all executed in the US. 187 Th e Commission requested the protection of inmates who were in terrible health condition in 25 matters. Whether the States have actually complied with these requests is hard to say because the Commission only provided clear information about the compliance in three cases. In these three cases, it was reported that the States provided the inmates with medical treatment outside prison. 188 In six cases, the Commission only indicated that it continues to monitor the situation of persons under protection. 189 Furthermore, the Commission has not presented information about compliance in 15 cases. 190 With regard to the compliance of PMs by the IACHR, depending on the factual situation of each case and the willingness of each State, the measures ordered by the Court are complied with in many diff erent ways. Th e protection given by the States in cases related to prisons has aimed to improve the conditions of detention through prison reforms, 191 to contract new prison guards, 192 to organise 182 pedagogical activities, 193 to confi scate arms 194 and to transfer benefi ciaries to other detention centres. 195 Additionally, a number of States have organized new trials, which have resulted in the modifi cation of the punishment to which the benefi ciaries had been condemned at the outset. In this sense, in the Suarez Rosero v Ecuador, the Loayza Tamayo v Peru, the Gallardo Rodriguez v Mexico and the Cesti Hurtado v Peru cases, the States decided to comply with the PM, thereby ordering the liberation of the benefi ciaries. 196 In James, Briggs, Noel, Garcia and Bethel v Trinidad and Tobago, the State, in complying with the PMs, ordered a new trial that resulted in the reduction of two death sentences to four years in prison for two of the benefi ciaries and the reduction of the death sentence to seven years in prison for another benefi ciary. 197 In this same case, but with respect to other benefi ciaries, Trinidad and Tobago suspended the execution of some sentences while the cases were being resolved in the Inter-American system. In those cases, death sentences were suspended for 39 condemned men. An important case to be mentioned is Persons imprisoned in the "Dr Sebastiao Martins Silveira" Penitentiary in Araraquara, Sao Paulo v Brazil. Here, the Court lift ed the PM because the condition of detention had improved and the situation of extreme gravity and urgency had ceased for the prisoners. 198 Non-compliance with PMs issued by the IACHR has also occurred on numerous occasions. Most of these cases are related to PMs adopted collectively, for example, in Mendoza Prisons case v Argentina six inmates were killed while the measures were in force; 199 in Monagas Judicial Confi nement Center ("La Pica") v Venezuela three benefi ciaries were killed; 200 in Children Deprived of Liberty in the "Complexo do Tatuape" of FEBEM v Brazil two benefi ciaries were killed. 201 Th e Urso Branco Prison v Brazil case is of special concern because of the number of benefi ciaries who were killed and also for the manner in which it occurred: some of the bodies were cut up 193 Intersentia and pieces were thrown at the authorities and at other persons who were present in the jail. 202 Realising that the inclusion of PMs in its annual report to the OAS General Assembly has very little political eff ect and did not in any way strengthen compliance, 203 the Court adopted a practice of remaining engaged with its orders for PMs by issuing 'orders on monitoring provisional measures'. In 2012, it ordered the highest number ever of orders pertaining to the monitoring or supervision of PMs, namely 28. 204 Especially matters not related to pending cases oft en stay under the Court's jurisdiction for many years. Th e Court monitors compliance with PMs by requiring States, benefi ciaries and the Commission to submit reports, and may convene public or private hearings. 205 It also publishes information about these procedures on its website. By the end of 2012, the Court was monitoring 31 PMs. 206 Th is number is slightly lower than the peak of 46 PMs that the Court had under its supervision in 2006 and 2010. 207 One of these cases was the Matter of Certain Venezuelan Penitentiary Centres, in which the Court has made numerous orders on maintaining and monitoring compliance with PMs.
CONCLUSIONS
Analysing the case law of international human rights bodies is interesting, not only because it permits comparisons of the evolution of the jurisprudence of the quasijudicial organs under examination, but also because the case law is a mirror of the problems within society. Th e study of the PMs issued by the African and the InterAmerican Commissions and Courts with regard to prisoners shows that detainees are in many cases kept in undignifi ed conditions, which goes against the core of human rights treaties. Benefi ciaries of PMs have included political prisoners, human rights defenders, presumed terrorists, ordinary criminals, ill persons and minors. Interim measures have protected persons sentenced to death without due process, prisoners with health problems and without access to medical care, and in general prisoners being kept in appalling prison conditions. In the circumstances mentioned above, through PMs, States are requested to suspend death penalty orders to improve the prison conditions of the detainees, and to allow ill prisoners to receive medical treatment in a prison hospital or in a specialised institution. States comply with the requests given by the African and the Inter-American Commission and Court in some matters. In these matters, the rights of the persons deprived of their liberty were 202 protected, especially the right to life, the right to personal integrity, the right to due process and the right to health. Th e study of the case law also shows that negative factors are constantly present and this prevents PMs to have the desirable results.
One of the problems pertaining to the Commissions in both human rights systems is the lack of publication of all requests for PMs. In the African system, it is (virtually) impossible to establish exactly how many PMs have been adopted by the African Commission, and whether the State concerned complied with the request. Th e lack of exact numbers is due to the fact that the African Commission does not keep a register of the PMs it has adopted or rejected, a factor further exacerbated by the requirement that the Commission's fi ndings remain confi dential until their publication has been approved by the AU Assembly (or, in practice, the Executive Council). With regard to the Americas, PMs issued by the IACmHR to protect persons deprived of liberty have been adopted on 210 occasions until now, but there is no information about the measures which have been rejected or not yet decided. 208 It would be good if petitioners, in the African system and in the Americas, developed ways to communicate with and inform each other and the international community about their requests for PMs. A free fl ow of information on the issue of interim measures is important in order to permit individual and social accountability in time, as currently it is made virtually impossible to criticise or condemn contemporaneous regimes blatantly violating human rights. A timely condemnation before the violations of human rights have happened could be useful in order to pressure States for the compliance of PMs or to shame States which do not implement them. 209 Another negative factor is the lack of follow-up reporting by these Commissions. As a result, it is not possible to have a complete evaluation of compliance, as it is oft en not clear what happened with the benefi ciaries. Furthermore, there are numerous instances in both the Inter-American and the African systems in which the respondent States have refused to comply with PMs. 210 If States do not implement interim measures, the eff ectiveness of these measures leaves much to be desired. With regard to the suspension of orders of execution, the IACmHR has published information on one-third of the measures adopted of which less than half were complied with. 211 It was reported that prisoners in America and in Africa were executed despite the request for PMs.
While there is evidence that the two regional systems have protected persons deprived of liberty, there is still a long road ahead with regard to ensuring respect for 208 According to art 25(7) of the amended 2013 Commission's Rules of Procedure only the decisions granting, extending, modifying or lift ing precautionary measures shall be adopted through reasoned resolutions. 209 Burbano-Herrera and Viljoen (n 58).
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Saro-Wiwa case (n 37) in regard to Nigeria; Banda case (n 57, in regard to Zambia and Zimbabwean Daily News case (n 57) in regard to Zimbabwe. 211 Burbano-Herrera and Viljoen (n 58). human rights. Th e Commissions have granted such measures with the aim to enhance their preventive mandate by protecting persons in situations of danger of serious harm in violation of the human rights norms. However, there is still room for improvement which will require good faith eff orts by the States, civil society, academia and other stakeholders of the system for the benefi t of persons under threat.
Th e Inter-American Commission and Court have dealt not only with PMs benefi tting individuals, but also directed them at large groups of people. In the process, not only the threats to individuals, but also general systemic issues were addressed. Surprisingly perhaps, given the foregrounding of collective 'peoples' rights in the African Charter, the African system has by contrast adopted measures much more focused on the individual. Th rough continuous supervision of its PMs, the IACHR has also aimed to fi ll the gap left by the lack of political backing from the political organs of the OAS. However, it should not escape attention that the two States that feature very prominently in the Commission and the Court's jurisprudence on PMs, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, have both denounced the Convention.
Although the situation of detainees in Latin America and Africa seems diff erent in that fewer reports of extreme forms of prison violence emanate from African prisons, there are also many shared characteristics. African prisons perennially suff er from problems of overcrowding, lack of basic sanitation, and a failure to separate children from adults and convicted prisoners from detainees awaiting trial. 212 As the African system, and in particular the African Court, forges a role of eff ectively complement to national protection of persons held in detention facilities, it could gain considerably from being inspired and drawing from the Latin American experience.
Th e argument is not that these regional institutions should replace the national system or other regional or global processes. At the African regional level, for example, the African Commission's Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention also has a very important role to play in addressing situations of danger to detainees. Th is Special Rapporteur undertakes visits to inspect prisons and other places of detention in countries party to the African Charter, and may issue urgent appeals to States. A major drawback constraining the Rapporteur's potential role is the requirement that such visits can only take place with the consent of the States, making it likely that detainees most at risk may not be aff ected by this procedure. Even if a report is written and recommendations or urgent appeals are adopted, the recommendations are as a matter of international law not formally binding. Although States have sometimes responded positively and adopted some of the suggested changes, the AU political organs have not put any pressure on States to act more decisively. Th e equivalent institution in the OAS is the Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons Deprived of their Liberty. Th is Rapporteur has a similar mandate to that of 212 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and Conditions of Detention in Africa (n 2). the African, but may 'visit detention centres or facilities in which juveniles are held in custody, even without prior notice to the correctional authorities'. 213 Th e European system may also be of increasing relevance, as it comes to terms with systemic violations through its 'pilot judgments' procedure. In fact, a closer convergence between the three systems is emerging in many respects, and is also likely to happen in relation to interim measures. At the global level, the UN Convention on Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment and its Optional Protocol instituting the Sub-Committee on Prevention of Torture, are obviously also of relevance, as well as the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture. 214 Th e main advantage of the African and Inter-American systems is the closer connection between the system and those aff ected, and the possibility of binding legal measures adopted by a court.
Measures that exist at the international (regional or global) level are always supplementary to what exists at the national level. It is up to State institutions, National Human Rights Institutions and specialised prison inspection bodies (if they exist), NGOs, other civil society organs, including the media, lawyers and others to ensure better protection for one of the most vulnerable groups in our societies. Should these domestic measures fall short, this article has shown that the regional systems have a signifi cant role to play in protecting these persons and their rights, and at the very least, to break the shield behind which detainees' rights are concealed, to ensure greater public scrutiny and accountability. 
